Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs

2006

Utah v. Raymond Charles Marquez : Reply Brief
Utah Court of Appeals

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Christine F. Soltis; assistant attorney general; Mark L. Shurtleff; attorney general; Gene E. Strate;
Carbom County Attorney; counsel for appellee.
Samuel S. Bailey; counsel for appellant.
Recommended Citation
Reply Brief, Utah v. Marquez, No. 20060710 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2006).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2/6722

This Reply Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of Appeals
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff Appellant,

Appellate No.

20060710

Criminal

051700158

vs.
No.

Raymond Charles Marquez,

Defendant Appellee,

REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT

APPEAL FROM SUPPRESSION RULING
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
THE HONORABLE SCOTT JOHANSEN PRESIDING.

Samuel S. Bailey # 9083
220 East 200 South
Price, Utah 84501
Christine F. Soltis #3039
Assistant Attorney General
MARK L. SHURTLEFF # 4 666
Utah Attorney General
160 East 300 South, 6th floor
P.O. Box 140854
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-0854

Counsel

for

Appellant

GENE E. STRATE
Carbon County Attorney

Counsel

for

Appellee

Defendant Appellant is presently incarcerated in the Utah State
Prison.
A PUBLISHED DECISION IS REQUESTED BY APPELLANT
FILED
UTAH APPELLATE C

FEB 0 9 2007

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff Appellant,

: Appellate No.

20060710

vs.
: Criminal

No.

051700158

Raymond Charles Marquez,

Defendant Appellee,

REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM SUPPRESSION RULING
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
THE HONORABLE SCOTT JOHANSEN PRESIDING.
Samuel S. Bailey # 9083
220 East 200 South
Price, Utah 84501
Christine F. Soltis #3039
Assistant Attorney General
MARK L. SHURTLEFF # 4 666
Utah Attorney General
160 East 300 South, 6th floor
P.O. Box 140854
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-0854

Counsel

for

Appellant

GENE E. STRATE
Carbon County Attorney
Counsel

for

Appellee

Defendant Appellant is presently incarcerated in the Utah State
Prison.
A PUBLISHED DECISION IS REQUESTED BY APPELLANT

TABLE OF CONTENTS
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

(ii)

REPLY TO S T A T E M E N T O F FACTS

(1)

ARGUMENT

( 6)

I.

Defendant is not r e q u i r e d to M a r s h a l the e v i d e n c e

(6)

II.

Officer Wood's search of the Defendant's body after he had
been detained and handcuffed was unjustifiable
(8)

CONCLUSION

(12 )

i

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Federal Cases
Michigan

v.

Summers,

Muehler

v. Mena,

Yabarra

v.

452 U.S. 692 (1981)

(8)

544 U.S. 93 (2005)

Illinois,

AAA U.S. 85, 91 (1979)

(8)
(8,11-12)

Utah Cases
Am. Bush v. City of
1266 (Utah 2006)
Chen v.

Stewart,

S.

Salt

Lake,

140 P.3d 1235,
(8)

2004 UT 82, 100 P.3d 1177,

1181 (Utah Sup. Ct 2004)

(6-7)

State v.

Alverez,

(8-9)

State

Thompson,

v.

State of

Utah v.

2006 UT 61, P15 (Utah 2006)
810 P.2d 415, 417-18, 420 (Utah 1991)
Brake,

(8)

103 P.3d 699,701 (Utah Sup. Ct.

2004)

(6-7)

State v.

Warren,

37 P.3d 270,273 (Utah Ct. App. 2001)

State

Warren,

78 P.3d 590 (Utah 2003)

v.

(11)
(7,9)

Other Authorities
The BLUEBOOK, a Uniform System of Citation, (17th ed. 2000)... (2)
Constitutional Provisions
U.S. Constitution. Amend. IV

(8)

UT. Const, art. I § 14

(8)

UT. R. App. P. 24(a)(7), (e)

(1)

ii

OBJECTION TO THE STATE'S STATEMENT OF FACTS
Defendant objects to the State's Statement of Facts and requests
that the information contained therein be stricken as follows:
1. Appellee's Statement of Facts does not comply with the
requirements of Rule 24(a)(7) of the Rules of Appellate
Procedure. Ut. R. App. P. 24(a)(7);(e) (West 2006).

Five

sentences1 in the State's Statement of Facts contain
statements of facts that fail to cite the record below as
required by that rule. Brief

of Appellee,

at 4.

2. Contrary to Rule 24(e) of the Utah rule of Appellate
Procedure, footnote three of the Appellee's brief contains a
citation to a document not found in the record index
prepared in accordance to Rule 11(b) of the Rules of
Appellate Procedure. Brief of Appellee at 4, fn. 3; Ut. R.
App. P. ll(b);24(e) (West 2006).
3. Appellee sets forth in its Statement of Facts the following
assertions of fact, that are not found in the record.
a.

The fourth sentence in the Statement of Facts asserts
that Raymond Gerrish decided
home. Id.

to go to Shawn Cloward's

Although the record indicates that Raymond

Gerrish was at the home of Shawn Cloward, there is
nothing in the record cited by the State that supports

Sentences numbers 1,3,7,8, and 13 of the State's Statement
of Facts, do not contain a record citation to support the facts
contained therein.
1

this argument that it was Gerrish's decision to go to or
to be present at the home of Shawn Cloward. R.73.
b.

The sixth sentence asserts that Raymond Gerrish trusted
others who were on Shawn Cloward's property to act as
lookouts. Brief

of Appellee,

at 3.

There is nothing in

the record to suggest that the "lookouts" that Officer
Anderson refers to in his Search Warrant Affidavit, were
present at the residence, were trusted by the defendant,
that they were going to warn him, or that they had been
assigned to lookout for the "wrong person". Id.;
c.

R.73.2

Sentence number ten asserts that the confidential
informant, referred to in the Search Warrant Affidavit,
realized that Raymond Garrish was hiding from the
police. Brief

of Appellee,

at 3.

The record does not

indicate how the informant obtained his information or
what his subjective realizations were. R.73.
d.

Sentence number eleven of the Statement of Facts
indicates that the confidential informant immediately
contacted police. Brief

of Appellee,

at 3.

The record

indicates that the confidential informant saw Raymond
2

The State in its brief improperly uses a Cf. cite when
citing to the record. Brief of Appellee at 3. The fact that
there are people on the property of another acting as lookouts is
not sufficiently analogous to assume that a person who is not the
owner of the property trusts the lookouts; that the person has
asked those people to lookout for him; or that they are reporting
to the person what they see. The BLUEBOOK, a Uniform System of
Citation, 23. (17th ed. 2000).
2

Gerrish at Shawn Cloward's home on the same day that the
warrant was issued. R.73.

However, there is nothing in

the record that indicates how soon the confidential
informant contacted the police after he saw Raymond
Gerrish at the home of Shawn Cloward. Id.;
e.

R.73.

Sentence number eleven asserts that when the
confidential informant reported his information to the
police, they immediately secured a search warrant for
Shawn Cloward's home and property. Brief
3.

of Appellee,

at

The record indicates that the law enforcement

officers requested a search warrant sometime during the
same day that they received the information from the
confidential informant. R.73.

There is nothing in the

record that indicates when the search warrant was
secured.
f.

Sentence number fourteen asserts that for the
concealment and the safety of the officers, judicial
permission was given to search the property at night.
Brief

of Appellee,

at 4.

The Justice of the Peace who

issued the search warrant does not indicate that the
reasons for allowing a night search were for officers'
safety. R.73.
g.

Sentence twenty-six asserts that Officer Wood suspected
that the Defendant was Gerrish or Gerrish's accomplice.
Brief

of Appellee,

at 5.
3

Nothing in the record cited by

the State, supports this assertion. Id.

Officer Wood

did not testify that he suspected the Defendant was
Gerrish. R.68:27-28,31.

He testified that he didn't

know, "what the situation was in the house/ 7 and that he
didn't know the identity of the Defendant or the
identity of Gerrish. Id.

Officer Wood did not testify

that he was concerned that the Defendant was an
accomplice.

Id.

Sentence thirty-three asserts that Officer Wood asked
the Defendant who he was because he suspected that the
Defendant was an accomplice.

Brief

of Appellee

at 5.

Nothing in the record cited by the State, supports this
assertion. Id.;R.68:27,31-32.

Officer Wood did not

testify that he suspected that the Defendant was the
fugitive's accomplice. R.68:27.

The officer only

testified that he did not know "what the situation was
inside the house." Id.

He did not testify why he asked

the Defendant for his name. R.68:31.
Sentence forty-one asserts that when Officer Anderson
entered the home of Shawn Cloward, that Sylvia Marquez
was screaming and yelling.

Brief

of Appellee,

at 6.

The record cited by the State does not support this
assertion. Id.;

R.68:17,19-20.

Officer Anderson does

not indicate when Mrs. Marquez began yelling. R.

4

68:17,19-20.
Sentence forty-three asserts that Officer Anderson
ordered both Raymond Gerrish and his mother to the
ground and that Mrs. Marquez did not comply with that
order. Brief

of Appellee,

at 6.

The record cite

provided by the State does not support this assertion.
Id.;

R.68:19-20.

Officer Anderson testified that he

ordered Gerrish to get on the ground. R.68:19.

Officer

Anderson did not testify that he ordered both Raymond
Marquez and his mother Silvia to get on the ground.

Id.

Sentence fifty-four asserts that upon entry into the
home, a marijuana bong was in plain view. Brief
Appellee,

at 7.

of

The record cite provided by the State

does not support this assertion. Id.

The officers at

the suppression hearing, and the officer who signed the
second Search Warrant Affidavit, did not indicate that
they saw a bong. Id.;

R.68:6,7,14,15,20,21,23,31,32;

R.74.

5

ARGUMENT
I.

Defendant was not required to Marshal the evidence.
The majority of the State's brief is spent arguing that the

Defendant failed to adequately marshal the evidence. Brief
Appellee
Chen v.
highly

It argues, relying on State

at 7-13,15.
Stewart,

v.

of

Brake,

and

that because a suppression hearing ruling is

fact dependent, that the Defendant is required to marshal

the evidence. Id.

at 9.

The State's reliance upon those cases is

improper and outside the scope of law contemplated by those
rulings.
In Chen v.

Stewart,

the Utah Supreme Court granted the

defendants' petition for relief from interlocutory orders that
arose out of a lawsuit alleging corporate waste. Chen v. Stewart,
100 P.3d 1177,1181 (Utah 2004).

Chen involved twenty-seven

individually named parties, ten unidentified John Doe defendants,
and two-hundred pages of findings of fact and conclusions of law.
Id.

at 1177.

Discussing the standard of review, the court held,

"even where the defendants purport to challenge only the legal
ruling, as here if a determination of the correctness of a
court's application of a legal standard is extremely

fact-

sensitive, the defendants also have a duty to marshal the
evidence." Id.
State

v.

at 1184,1185. (Emphasis added).
Brake

is a criminal case where the defendant

challenged the rulings denying the suppression of evidence.

Page -6-

State

v.

Brake,

103 P.3d 699, 701 (Utah 2004),

The court in

Brake

explained, "the legal analysis of search and seizure cases is
highly

fact dependent.

of the facts." Id.
are numerous.

We therefore begin with a full narration

The legal differences between these two cases

One important distinction is the level of

discretion the reviewing court gives to the trial court's
different types of findings of fact. Chen,

at 1184,fn 5.

In a

criminal case that involves a search and seizure challenge, a
reviewing court gives little discretion to the trial court's
findings of fact. State

v. Warren,

Whereas in cases like Chen,

78 P.3d 590 (Utah 2003).

a broad amount of discretion is

afforded the trial court's findings. Chen at 1184,fn 4.
The State makes no attempt to justify the cross application
of these two very different cases, areas of law, facts, and legal
standards. Brief

of Appellee

at 8-13.

Defendant objects to the

State's argument and requests it be stricken from the State's
brief.

The requirement to marshal the evidence has never been

demanded of a defendant challenging the legal conclusions of
suppression ruling.
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II.

Officer Wood's search of the Defendant's body after he had
been detained and handcuffed was unjustifiable.
The State in its response cites no controlling precedent for

its proposition that, when executing a search warrant, "'police
may lawfully detain, handcuff, and question those found on the
premises." Brief

of Appellee

at 13.

Article I Section 14 of the

Utah Constitution frequently affords more protections to its
citizens than afforded under the U.S. Constitution. Am. Bush

v.

City

v.

of

Thompson,

S.

Salt

Lake,

140 P.3d 1235, 1266 (Utah 2006); State

810 P.2d 415, 417-18, 420 (Utah 1991); U.S.

Constitution. Amend. IV (West 2006); UT. Const, art. I § 14 (West
2006) .3
The crucial question upon which this appeal rests, is what
level of suspicion a reasonable officer must have to first,
detain and handcuff, and then second, search the body of a

3

Furthermore, the authority cited by the State is not
relevant to the primary issue in this case. Summers and Muehler
do not support the proposition that when executing a search
warrant, in addition to cuffing, detaining, questioning,
handcuffing, a compliant visitor's body may also be searched.
Muehler
v. Menaf 544 U.S. 93 (2005); Michigan
v. Summers, 452
U.S. 692 (1981). Allowing an officer to frisk as well as
handcuff detain and question a visitor of a home for which a
search warrant has been issued violates the protections described
by Ybarra,
and exceed the facts explained in Muehler and Summers.
Yharra v. Illinios,
AAA U.S. 85 (1979); Id.
The State does not cite any controlling authority that
supports its proposition that "the officer's subjective
motivation is irrelevant." To the complete contrary the Utah
Supreme Court recently re-affirmed its holding that an officer's
subjective belief is a factor, to be considered in a reasonable
suspicion analysis. State
v. Alvarez,
2006 Utah 61, P15.
Page -8-

compliant visitor of a home that is being search pursuant to a
warrant.

First, Utah law allows law enforcement officers to

temporarily detain and question those persons about whom there is
a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. State
2006 Utah 61 P.14.

v.

Alverez,

That detention is limited in scope to the

type of criminal activity and it must be brief and non-intrusive.
Id.

at P10.
Second, Law enforcement officers are rightly allowed to,

without a warrant, briefly search the bodies of those persons who
they reasonably suspect pose a risk to their safety. State
Warren,

78 P.3d 590 (Utah 2003).

v.

They are also allowed to search

the body of a person when exigent circumstances permit that
search. Alverez,

at P21.

In this case there are no facts which reasonably justify
Officer Wood's search of the Defendant's person; this especially
after he had already been detained and handcuffed. R. 68:26-31.
The Defendant was completely compliant. R.68:23-29.

He was lying

face down on the floor with his hands handcuffed behind his back.
R. 68:26.

Officer Wood testified he did not see anything that

caused him to feel concerned for officers safety. R.68:28.

There

were at least five officers in a home that contained four
occupants. R.68:6,9-10,13.

The subject of the warrant, Gerrish,

was handcuffed, detained, and arrested, within the first twenty
to thirty seconds of the officers' entry into the home. R.68:19-
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20.
The State argues that a concern for the safety of the
officers was justified by unidentified information of possible
lookouts, the officers' failure to recognize Gerrish, their not
knowing the situation inside the home before entering, the
paraphernalia inside the home, and Silvia Marquez's hysterical
conduct. Brief

of Appellee

at 13-18.

Prior to and after entering

the home there is no evidence in this case to suggest that the
Defendant or the occupants of the home were dangerous,
aggressive, or violent.4

There is nothing in the facts of this

case to justify a reasonable concern for officers safety5 or
exigent circumstances.
Officer Wood's failure to recognize the Gerrish does not

4

The State in its response argues that Sylvia Marquez's
emotional behavior, and her and her son's backpedaling at seeing
the entry of at least five armed law enforcement officers force
their way into the home justifies Officer Wood's search of
Defendant's body. Brief
of Appellee,
at 11. The State's argument
is simply not reasonable. Officer Anderson testified Mrs.
Marquez was emotional and was yelling why are you here. R.68:1920. He also testified that she was in another room.
He did not testify that she was behaving violently or that
he thought she would. R.68:19-21. However even if she did, the
State fails to explain why her behavior would justify a
reasonable belief that the Defendant, who was handcuffed, lying
face down on the floor, in another room, posed a reasonable risk
to the officers.
The fact that Gerrish and Sylvia Marquez began to backpedal,
as the armed officers forced their entry without more does not
justify the Defendant's search for officers safety. R.68:6-7, 2628.
5

Officer Wood testified the needle in the Defendant's
pocket could have been used as a weapon. R.68:27,28. The needle
was only found as a result of the illegal search.
Page -10-

justify a reasonable concern that the Defendant posed an officers
safety risk.
2001).

State

v Warren,

37 P.3d 270, 273 (Utah Ct. App.

There is no evidence that Gerrish was violent.

He was

wanted for his failure to comply with his probation conditions
and possession of a small amount of drugs. R.73.
these crimes are inherently violent. Warren,

Neither of

at 273.

Even if the

Defendant had been Gerrish, a concern for officers safety without
more, reliance upon his arrest warrant, would not have justified
his search.
The presence of drugs and drug paraphernalia throughout the
home, absent the area of the home that Defendant occupied, does
not justify a search of the defendant's person.

Even if the

drugs and paraphernalia which were in plain view were the
Defendant's, possession of a small amount of drugs does not pose
a risk to officer's safety. State

v.

Warren,

importantly the U.S. Supreme Court held in

at 270.

More

Ybarra,

a person's mere propinquity to others independently
suspected of criminal activity does not, without more
give rise to ... search that person
The initial frisk of Ybarra was simply not supported by
a reasonable belief that he was armed and presently
dangerous, a belief which this Court has invariably held
must form the predicate to a patdown of a person for
weapons.
Ybarra v. Illinois,
444 U.S. 85,91,92,93 (1979).
The facts in Ybarra

are in many ways similar to the instant
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case.6 Id.

In this case as in Ybarra

at 93.

the Defenant was

unjustifiably searched simply for the reason he was in present
when a search warrant for the home he was visiting was executed.
Id.
CONCLUSION
Defendant respectfully requests that the Trial Court's denial of
his motion to suppress be reversed.
DATED this

[)

day of February, 2007.

Samuel S. Bailey
Attorney for the Defendant

6

The facts of Yabarra as described by the high court are as
follows:
When the police entered the Aurora Tap Tavern on March 1
1976, the lighting was sufficient for them to observe the
customers. Upon seeing Ybarra, they neither recognized
him as a person with a criminal history nor had any
particular reason to believe that he might be inclined to
assault them. Moreover, as Police Agent Johnson later
testified, Ybarra, whose hands were empty, gave no
indication of possessing a weapon, made no gestures or
other action indicative of an intent to commit an
assault, and acted generally in a manner that was not
threatening. . . .
In short the State is unable to
articulate any specific fact that would have justified a
police officer at the scene in even suspecting that
Ybarra was armed and dangerous.

Ybarra at 93.
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